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What makes a good leader? A good leader is able to coordinate his followers around a credible mission
statement, which communicates the future course of action of the organization. In practice, leaders
learn about the best course of action for the organization over time. While learning helps improve
the organization's goals it also creates a time-consistency problem. Leader resoluteness is a valuable
attribute in such a setting, since it slows down the leader's learning and thus improves the credibility
of the mission statement. But resolute leaders also inhibit communication with followers and leader
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lveldkam@stern.nyu.edu￿Consistency of word and deed on the leader￿ s part is absolutely neces-
sary if others are to commit themselves to the personal and business risks
associated with new and unproven courses of action. The general manager
who runs hot and cold will fail to encourage con￿dence in others. ... No-
body wants to go out on a limb and risk being abandoned at the ￿rst sound
of cracking wood.￿Aguilar (1988)
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider a model of leadership in organizations. The role of leadership
we focus on is that of helping coordinate the actions of the di⁄erent members of an
organization. The role of the leader is to give a sense of direction for the organization.
The leader evaluates the environment in which the organization operates and deter-
mines the best strategy adapted to that environment. The leader￿ s dilemma is that he
would like to base the organization￿ s focus (or mission) on all the relevant information
about the environment available to him. But, since information about the environ-
ment only trickles in over time, the leader may then be led to revise the organization￿ s
direction as new information becomes available. His desire to modify the direction of
the organization over time thus undermines his ability to coordinate the actions of the
other members of the organization.
In other words, the essence of the leadership problem in our model is to reconcile
the adaptation to a changing environment￿ which requires information acquisition and
revision of the organization￿ s strategy in response to new information￿ and coordination
of the actions of the other members of the organization. Thus, the main question we
are interested in here, is determining which attributes of a leader are most desirable in
balancing the need for adaptation with coordination.
Our leadership problem can be captured in a simple setup involving four stages. In
the ￿rst stage the leader observes a ￿rst signal of the environment (or state of nature)
the organization is likely to be in. Based on that signal the leader can de￿ne a mission
2or overall strategy for the organization. In a second stage, the other members of the
organization ￿the followers ￿decide how closely they want to stick to the leader￿ s
strategy. They may not be inclined to blindly follow the leader￿ s proposed strategy
because they also observe signals about the state of nature, and they may come up
with di⁄erent forecasts of what the ultimate direction for the organization will be. In a
third stage the leader receives a second signal. This signal could be an aggregate of the
signals of the followers or simply new information that becomes available. The leader
implements the organization￿ s strategy given all the information he has available. Since
the followers have already acted, the leader at this point is no longer concerned about
coordinating their actions. The leader￿ s only remaining goal is to adopt a strategy for
the organization that is best given all the information he has. In the fourth and last
stage, once the strategy has been implemented, the organization￿ s payo⁄s are realized.
These will be higher the better adapted the strategy is to the environment and the
better coordinated all the members￿actions are.
In this setup, the followers in the organization may be concerned about two po-
tential ￿ aws in leadership: one is that the leader misdiagnoses the circumstances the
organization ￿nds itself in and chooses a maladapted mission for the group; the other
is that the mission is incoherently implemented with substantial coordination failures.
What makes a good leader in such a situation? We argue that a key attribute of
a good leader is a form of overcon￿dence, which we shall refer to as resoluteness. A
resolute leader has a strong prior and is slow to change his mind in the face of new
information about the environment in which the organization operates. A resolute
leader attaches an exaggerated information value to his initial information, or on the
signals he processes himself. In other words, a resolute leader trusts his own initial
judgement more than an open-minded, rational leader, and also more than that of other
members of the organization. He then tends to de￿ne a strategy for the organization
based disproportionately on his own best initial assessment of the environment the ￿rm
3￿nds itself in.
The reason that such resoluteness is valuable is that the con￿ icting desires to coor-
dinate followers and adapt the mission create a time-consistency problem. The leader
would like to followers to believe that his mission statement is what he will ultimately
implement. But followers know that ex-post the leader will want to revise the organi-
zation￿ s strategy in response to new information after they have acted. This is what
causes them to be insu¢ ciently coordinated, as each attempts to guess how the leader
will revise the organization￿ s strategy in light of what they know about the environ-
ment. A resolute leader who puts too little weight on new information from other
members is more likely to follow through with the initial mission, which helps coor-
dinate followers￿actions around that mission. We show that this coordination bene￿t
outweighs the potential maladaptation cost as long as the leader￿ s determination is not
too extreme.
While resoluteness helps a leader to commit to ￿staying the course￿it also raises the
risk for the organization of pursuing the wrong strategy. One might wonder, therefore,
whether there aren￿ t better ways of achieving commitment, without at the same time
putting too much weight on the leader￿ s initial beliefs. If a rational leader were able to
commit to a strategy for the organization in the ￿rst stage by, say, staking his reputation
on pursuing a clearly de￿ned mission, in a manner similar to President George H.W.
Bush￿ s announcement, ￿read my lips: no new taxes￿ , wouldn￿ t that be a superior
form of commitment? It turns out that even when such a commitment technology is
available, a resolute leader still outperforms a rational one, since an unwavering leader
makes a stronger mission statement but incurs less of the commitment cost.
Finally, we consider an extension where the leader learns about the environment by
observing followers￿actions, which imperfectly convey their signals. That is, in addition
to top-down information ￿ ow, we also allow for bottom-up information ￿ ow. In such a
situation it is more important for the leader to let followers￿base their actions on the
4signal they observe, so as to transmit more information back to the leader. Since less
coordination brings about better adaptation, observing actions moderates the bene￿ts
of resoluteness. In other words, resolute managers make bad listeners and learn little.
A leader￿ s failure to listen to followers is especially costly when followers have very
precise information.
The second main result is that observing followers￿actions creates a feedback e⁄ect
that can generate multiple equilibria: If followers expect the leader to ignore the infor-
mation from their actions, then the leader￿ s initial announcement is the best estimate
of his ￿nal action. If followers use only the announcement and not their private infor-
mation in forming actions, then the leader rightly ignores the aggregate action because
it is uninformative. On the other hand, if followers expect the leader to listen carefully
to the average action in forming policy, then they want to use their private signals to
forecast the policy change. Actions re￿ ect their information. An organization￿ s corpo-
rate culture could determine which equilibrium prevails. Thus, our framework captures
one aspect of corporate culture.
Most surprisingly, a resolute leader who acts as though he has precise information
might be a better leader than a more competent leader who is really better informed.
A leader whose competence is known may induce followers to rely only on his mission
statement, whereas a less competent but resolute leader could prompt followers to
use their private information, improving bottom-up information ￿ ow and managerial
decision-making.
Interestingly, in a ￿rst study of CEO characteristics based on a detailed data set of
candidates for CEO positions in private equity funded ￿rms, Kaplan, Klebanov, and
Sorensen (2007) ￿nd evidence consistent with our model predictions. Mainly, they ￿nd
that although companies tend to prefer hiring ￿team-players￿at equal levels of ability,
CEOs with ￿in their terminology ￿￿hard/execution related skills￿tend to outperform
CEOs with ￿soft/team related skills￿ . Or, in our terminology, more resolute, steadfast,
5CEOs, who stick to their guns, tend to be better leaders than ￿good listeners￿ .
An apt recent example of a business leadership situation that our model attempts
to capture is that of Sony Corporation. At the time when Sony recruited its new CEO,
Sir Howard Stringer, it faced major new challenges. Its old business model, electronics
appliance manufacturing, had been threatened by the spread of personal computers
and the growing importance of internet applications and software development. Its
leadership in portable electronic devices had been challenged by Apple and its strong
presence in the game-console markets was under threat from Microsoft￿ s X-box.
To be able to maintain its competitive position, Sony￿ s new leader needed to ac-
complish both of the objectives our model identi￿es: adapt to changing circumstances
and coordinate many actors. To adapt, Sony felt that it needed to change direction and
re-focus its operations around a new mission. The appointment of Howard Stringer was
seen as an important step towards this transformation. Howard Stringer and top Sony
management put together a major new strategy centered around the expansion of high
de￿nition digital technology and the development of Sony￿ s new Blu-ray standard.
The success of this change in strategy depended critically on how e⁄ective Sony was
in convincing consumers, movie producers, software developers, investors and Sony￿ s
own engineers and product managers that Sony￿ s new HD technology would be suc-
cessful. The credibility of the strategy would determine the responses of competitors
such as Apple and Microsoft, the rate of technological innovation in media technology,
and the eventual outcome of the standards war between Blu-ray and HD DVD.1 In
implementing his strategy, the challenge Stringer needed a clearly de￿ned and credible
mission that e⁄ectively coordinated many di⁄erent parties around this new strategy.
The main thrust of our argument is that if Howard Stringer was able to convey his
faith in the technology and the success of Sony￿ s overall strategy, and if he could cred-
ibly signal his determination in carrying through the overall plan, he would be able to
1See ￿In Blu-ray Coup, Sony Has Opening But Hurdles, Too￿by Sarah Mcbride, Yukari Iwakane
and Nick Wing￿eld, 7 January 2008, Wall Street Journal.
6substantially increase Sony￿ s chances of succeeding. The bene￿t of his resolute leader-
ship style would be that he could make it easier to coordinate Sony￿ s multiple divisions,
and also the decisions of outside software and content developers, thus increasing the
value of the new technological platform. The downside of his single-minded pursuit
of this mission, would, of course, be that by ￿rmly rallying the whole organization
around the new Blu-ray technology he could risk committing the whole corporation to
an obsolete or losing technology.
2 Related Literature
There is a small but rapidly growing economics literature on leadership. Most of this
literature, however, deals with di⁄erent facets of leadership. One of the earliest contri-
butions is by Rotemberg and Saloner (1993), who address the question of how a leader
can motivate followers to exert e⁄ort and come up with proposals for improvements in
the ￿rm￿ s operation. Followers value the fact that their proposals are taken into ac-
count and are adopted by the leader. They are therefore willing to exert (unobservable)
costly e⁄ort to come up with proposals if they expect that there is a reasonable chance
that they will be adopted. Rotemberg and Saloner consider two leadership styles. One
is where the leader maximizes pro￿ts, and the other where managerial decision-making
is more sensitive to the preferences of employees. They show that the latter approach
can ultimately lead to higher pro￿ts, as it induces employees to exert more e⁄ort and
thus brings about more improvements. In a subsequent related article, Rotemberg and
Saloner (2000) also allow the leader to encourage employee e⁄ort by ruling out possible
future courses of action, so that employees are better able to determine what kinds
of initiatives will be favored. Ruling out certain activities amounts to de￿ning the
organization￿ s focus. In this respect the leader￿ s objective of delineating the scope of
the organization in Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) is similar to the leader￿ s objective
of proposing a consistent plan in our setup. But, instead of asking how to maximize
7employee e⁄ort as in Rotemberg and Saloner, we ask a di⁄erent question: What kind
of leader best coordinates followers￿actions?
Hermalin (1998) considers the role of leadership by example in a moral hazard in
teams problem where organizational output depends on all members￿e⁄orts and where
all members share the aggregate output. As is well known, in a team production prob-
lem, individual team members may free-ride on other team members￿e⁄orts. Thus,
the leader￿ s problem is to motivate team members and help overcome free-riding. Her-
malin assumes that the leader has private information about the return to e⁄ort and
argues that the leader will then tend to overstate the return to e⁄ort so as to mitigate
free-riding. He will be able to motivate other team members to put in e⁄ort by leading
by example and exerting himself. Hermalin does not allow for leader steadfastness, but
his notion of leading by example is related to our conception of leadership as giving a
sense of direction to other organization members.
Another recent model of leadership in organizations by Majumdar and Mukand
(2007) also focuses on the leader￿ s role in coordinating the actions of multiple follow-
ers. In their model the leader is able to coordinate agents if he is thought to be able to
correctly identify circumstances when change is possible, and if he is able to commu-
nicate with a su¢ ciently large number of followers. Unlike in our model, their analysis
does not address the issue of leadership characteristics, such as resoluteness, and it
does not allow for a commitment problem for the leader.
Coordination also plays a central role in Dewan and Myatt (2007). This paper
argues that the leader￿ s clarity in communication is relatively more important than
giving a sense of direction. Their static model does not address the time consistency
problem that is central for our results.
Similarly, Ferreira and Rezende (2007) consider a related leadership problem in a
two-period and two-signal realization model, where the leader is trying to both induce
a complementary action by a follower and to adapt the ￿rm￿ s strategy to the ￿rm￿ s
8environment in the second period. Again, however, they do not focus on leader char-
acteristics (such as resoluteness) and instead focus on the question of the desirability
of using public disclosure of the ￿rm￿ s strategy as a commitment device.
A handful of papers explore the role of overcon￿dence in leadership. In Van Den
Steen (2005), managerial overcon￿dence helps attract and retain employees with similar
beliefs. The resulting alignment of beliefs helps ￿rms function more e¢ ciently. In
particular when similar followers and managers are paired, the manager is more likely to
implement projects or ideas proposed by an employee (which provides private bene￿ts
to the employee). As in Rotemberg and Saloner, employees are then induced to put in
more e⁄ort to identify new projects, which bene￿ts the organization.
Goel and Thakor (2008) study a model of managerial promotions and provide an
explanation for how companies tend to appoint overcon￿dent CEOs. They consider a
model where managers with unknown ability compete for leadership. In their model
managers make the best available project choices and the manager with the best project
outcome is selected as leader. They show that overcon￿dent managers tend to make
riskier project choices and are therefore more likely to be selected as leader. Similarly,
Gervais and Goldstein (2007) introduce overcon￿dence into a moral hazard in teams
problem akin to Hermalin (1998). In their model an overcon￿dent leader tends to
work harder and thus induces all other team members to coordinate around a higher
e⁄ort choice. Unlike in our model, however, they do not consider the time-consistency
problem of the leader and how resoluteness can mitigate this problem.
Finally, the study by Blanes I Vidal and M￿ller (2007) also emphasizes the potential
bene￿ts of leader overcon￿dence. They study a similar problem of information commu-
nication as Ferreira and Rezende (2007) in a static leader-follower setup. The bene￿t
of sharing information in their model is that it helps motivate the follower. But there
is also a cost, as the leader may put too much weight on concerns for motivating the
follower and too little on making accurate decisions based on her own soft information.
9Blanes I Vidal and M￿ller (2007) then show that in this context leader overcon￿dence
(or, self-con￿dence in their terminology) may help mitigate the leader￿ s motivational
bias under information sharing.
The model of organizations that is most closely related to ours is that of Dessein and
Santos (2006). As in our setup they also consider an organization￿ s tradeo⁄ between
achieving greater coordination and greater adaptation. However, they do not allow for
any role for leadership. In their model members of the organization coordinate through
direct communication.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model
of coordination and adaptation for the organization and the role of leadership in an
organization facing this tradeo⁄. Section 3 considers a slightly more general variant of
our model, where the leader can obtain information from other members of the orga-
nization revealed by their actions. Section 4 concludes with a summary and directions
for future research. Finally, an appendix contains the more involved proofs.
3 Coordination vs. adaptation
The tension between coordination and ￿ exibility arises ￿rst from changes in the envi-
ronment, which require adaptation, and second from the gradual arrival of information
about the environment. To illustrate this problem we consider a setting where the
leader receives an exogenous signal in each of two periods. Based on his initial be-
liefs, the leader proposes a strategy for the organization and get other members to
coordinate their actions around it. But the leader may change his mind and reorient
the strategy following the arrival of the second signal. While the ex-post reorientation
helps bring about better adaptation, the anticipation of possible changes in strategy
also make it harder to coordinate followers￿actions. The reason is that the followers
also observe a private signal about the environment and use this signal to forecast
possible reorientations of the organization￿ s strategy.
10We show that leader steadfastness is a valuable attribute in such a situation (Sec-
tion 3.1). The more resolute the leader the less likely he is to change his mind and
therefore the less likely is a possible reorientation of the organization￿ s strategy. Re-
markably, resoluteness remains a valuable attribute even when the leader can commit
to a strategy by staking his reputation (Section 3.2). We assume for now that signals
are exogenous. We explore endogenous signals, derived from the aggregate choice of
followers, in Section 4.
3.1 Merits of resoluteness
Model setup The organization we consider has one leader and a continuum of fol-
lowers indexed by i. The organization operates in an environment parameterized by ￿,
which a⁄ects payo⁄s and to which the organization must try to adapt as best it can.
The di¢ culty for the organization is that ￿ is not known perfectly to any member of
the organization. The leader of the organization and the other agents (the followers)
start with di⁄erent information or beliefs about the true value of ￿.
The leader di⁄ers from the followers in two ways: ￿rst he can de￿ne a mission
statement for the organization based on his initial beliefs2 ￿L ￿ N(￿;1) before the
followers obtain their own private information about ￿ and make their own moves.
Second, after the followers have received their own information about ￿ and have chosen
their actions ai the leader receives further information about ￿ in the form of a signal
SL. The leader then implements the strategy of the organization aL based on his
updated beliefs about ￿.
Followers value three things:
1. taking an action that is close to (or aligned with) the organization￿ s strategy;
2Note that we do not depart from the common prior assumption, which allows consistent welfare
statements. One can think of the initial beliefs as resulting from updating a ￿ at (improper) prior
based on an initial signal.
112. belonging to a well-coordinated organization, and
3. belonging to an organization that is well-adapted to its environment ￿.
Formally, we represent these preferences with the following objective function for
each follower:




(aj ￿ ￿ a)
2dj ￿ (aL ￿ ￿)
2 for i 2 [0;1] [ fLg (1)
One interpretation of this payo⁄ function is that the followers get a pay raise or
bonus for taking an action close to the ultimate policy choice of their organization/￿rm.
In addition, all followers get a share of ￿rm pro￿ts, which depends on the accuracy of
the ￿rm￿ s stated goal, and on the degree of coordination among followers.
The leader￿ s objective ￿L is the same as the followers and in this respect our model
of the organization is essentially a team problem ￿ la Marschak and Radner (1972).
However, our model is di⁄erent in two respects from a standard team problem. First,
as the leader is inevitably well coordinated with himself, we always have (ai ￿aL) = 0,
for i = L. Second, to the extent that a well coordinated action ai by follower i
bene￿ts both him and all other members of the organization, there is a coordination
externality among all members. And to the extent that the private and public values
of coordination are misaligned there is an additional role for leader resoluteness in our
model, namely to help internalize this coordination externality.3
Neither the leader nor followers know the true environment of the organization, ￿.
The leader begins with a prior belief ￿L and updates his beliefs based on a subsequent
private signal SL he independently receives. The leader makes a public announcement
3A separate on-line technical appendix posted on the authors￿websites explores alternative payo⁄
formulations. Assigning the leader and the ￿rm the same objective so that they share the concern
for misalignment makes the analysis more involved, but leaves our qualitative conclusions unchanged.
Similarly, if we weight the three terms of the payo⁄ function unequally, it does not reverse our
conclusions. A greater concern for alignment or coordination makes the optimal level of overcon￿dence
higher, while a greater concern for adaptation makes it smaller, but still positive. Finally, the appendix
explores di⁄erent forms of the coordination externality and commitment cost.
12of his beliefs as a mission statement for the organization before followers act. Followers
act in response to the leader￿ s mission statement and to their own information about
the environment. For simplicity we assume that followers start with a di⁄use prior,
which they update using a signal Si ￿ N(￿;￿2
￿) they each privately and independently
receive, as well as the leader￿ s mission statement ￿L. Followers are assumed to be all
rational and know the true variance of all signals.
The leader￿ s mission statement ￿L is credible because there is no incentive to manip-
ulate the level of followers￿expectations. The leader may have a form of overcon￿dence,
in the sense that he may underestimate the variance of his prior beliefs (or overestimate
the precision of his prior). More formally, although the prior has a true distribution
￿L ￿ N(￿;1) an overcon￿dent, or resolute, leader believes the prior to have a lower
variance ￿2
p ￿ 1.
After followers choose their action ai but before the leader chooses his action aL,
a signal SL ￿ N(￿;￿2
L) is observed by the leader.4 We assume that the true and
perceived precision of this signal are the same.
The rationale for modeling resoluteness as a higher precision of the leader￿ s prior,
is most clear in Section 4, when the signal SL is generated by other agents￿actions. In
essence, resoluteness in our model means that a leader trusts his own judgement more
than the information acquired from others. But for now, the leader cannot observe
followers￿actions or signals.
De￿nition 1 A Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is given by
(i) a strategy, or direction, for the organization aL that maximizes E [￿Lj￿L;SL];
(ii) a set of followers￿actions faigi2[0;1] that maximize E [￿ij￿L;Si].
4Note that if we allow for costly information acquisition by the leader at date t = 2 then our
model allows for an alternative interpretation than leader overcon￿dence. If the leader underinvests
in information acquisition ￿as he would if he privately bears all the costs ￿and if this is observable (or
anticipated) by followers when they act, then under-investment in second period information will have
the same e⁄ect as overcon￿dence in our model: the leader will put more weight on the ￿rst signal.
13Optimal actions We solve the model by backwards induction. When the leader
chooses the organization￿ s strategy aL, the actions of the agents faigi2[0;1] are already
determined. Since the ￿rst term of his payo⁄ function (1) is zero, the leader￿ s payo⁄
in the ￿nal stage of the game reduces to ￿E[(aL ￿￿)2]. The leader￿ s optimal choice of
strategy ex post then is to set aL as close to the true state as possible: aL = E[￿j￿L;SL].
According to Bayes￿law, this expectation is
aL = ￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)SL, (2)








A rational leader (with ￿2
p = 1) would set the weight ￿ equal to the relative precision
of the ￿rst signal and the second: 1=(1 + ￿
￿2
L ).
Each follower takes the actions of the others as given and cannot in￿ uence the
average action because he is of measure zero. Therefore, his objective function (1)
reduces to E [￿(ai ￿ aL)2j￿L;Si] and his optimal action ai is equal to his expectation
of the leader￿ s action, given his own private signal Si: ai = E[aLj￿L;Si]. Again by
Bayes￿law the follower￿ s belief is
ai = E[aLj￿L;Si] = ￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)Si]. (3)
The termin square brackets is the follower￿ s expectation of the leader￿ s signal E[SLj￿L;Si].
Since SL is an independent, unbiased signal about ￿, E[SLj￿L;Si] = E[￿j￿L;Si]. The
expectation of ￿ is a precision-weighted sum of ￿L and Si, where the weight on ￿L is
￿ := 1=(1 + ￿
￿2
￿ ).
14Optimal resoluteness. We de￿ne the organization￿ s payo⁄ ￿ (without subscript)
as the integral over all followers￿payo⁄s plus the leader￿ s payo⁄, assuming that the
leader along with all followers is of zero measure.5 The organization￿ s ex-ante expected
payo⁄ therefore also has three components:
1. the variance of each follower￿ s action around the leader￿ s,
E[￿(ai ￿ aL)




2. the dispersion of followers￿actions around the mean,
Z
j
￿(aj ￿ ￿ a)





3. the distance of the leader￿ s action from the true state,
E[￿(aL ￿ ￿)
2] = ￿￿




Summing the three terms and rearranging yields,
E￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)
2(￿ + 2￿
2
L + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿
2:




L ) is a measure of the leader￿ s resoluteness. The
higher is ￿ the more resolute is the leader. Therefore a simple way of determining the
e⁄ects of leader steadfastness on the organization￿ s overall welfare is to di⁄erentiate
the ex ante objective with respect to ￿.
5Note that all our qualitative results survive even if the leader has non-zero weight but the optimal
level of overcon￿dence may vary.




= 2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 2￿
2
L + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)) ￿ 2￿.
This is positive if
2￿
2




With a rational leader we have ￿2
p = 1, and therefore ￿
1￿￿ = ￿2
L. Thus, @E￿
@￿ > 0 at
￿
1￿￿ = ￿2
L, so that some degree of resoluteness is always optimal. On the other hand,
for an extremely stubborn leader who fails to update at all, ￿ ￿! 1 and the left side of
the inequality approaches in￿nity, so that @E￿
@￿ < 0. As ￿
1￿￿ is continuous for ￿ 2 (0;1),
@2E￿
@￿2 < 0 and since the weight ￿ is strictly increasing in the perceived precision ￿￿2
p ,
there exists an interior optimal level of resoluteness that maximizes the organization￿ s
expected payo⁄, which is given by
￿
￿2
p = 2 + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)￿
￿2
L . (4)
The 2 in Equation (4) is due to the fact that there are two reasons why resoluteness
increases the expected payo⁄ of the organization: First, steadfastness reduces the dis-
tance of the followers￿actions from the leader￿ s action (ai ￿ aL)2. Second, weighting
the later signal less reduces the error in the leader￿ s action that comes from the noise
in SL. Of course, there is a corresponding increase in the weight on the leader￿ s prior
that increases the error in the leader￿ s action that comes from noise in ￿L. That e⁄ect
is captured in the second term. The net e⁄ect of resoluteness is to increase the error
in the leader￿ s choice (aL ￿ ￿)2.
We summarize this discussion in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 The organization￿ s ex-ante payo⁄ is maximized with a leader￿ s res-
oluteness level of ￿￿2
p = 2 + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)￿
￿2
L > 1.
16In particular, since the second term in Equation (4) is always positive, it is strictly
bene￿cial for an organization to have a resolute leader.
3.2 Strength of the mission statement
As the preceding analysis highlights, resoluteness of a leader provides a form of com-
mitment to staying within the broad outlines of his mission. It ensures that the leader￿ s
strategy choice after learning new information does not deviate too much from the mis-
sion he set for the organization, which is centered on his prior belief. If the leader￿ s
beliefs do not change much, his strategy choice will be similar to his mission statement.
This commitment in turn facilitates coordination. However, to the extent that leader
resoluteness also introduces a bias in the organization￿ s adaptation to the environment,
it would seem that a more direct solution to the leader￿ s time-consistency problem ￿
allowing a rational leader to commit to staying the course ￿would be preferable. We
explore this question in this section by introducing such a commitment device into our
model. Speci￿cally, we add the possibility for the leader to stake his or the organiza-
tion￿ s reputation on carrying through a proposed mission. Should the leader choose
to deviate from the proposed course of action then the organization will incur an ad-
ditional cost that is increasing in the distance between the initial mission statement
and the ￿nal strategy. The higher is this cost, the stronger is the leader￿ s mission
statement.
An alternative interpretation of our commitment device is an incentive scheme for
the leader, where the organization sets a punishment for deviating from the proposed
mission (or a reward for carrying out a mission) that is increasing in the size of the
deviation. It would seem that if the organization can incentivize a rational leader to
optimally stay the course, then there is no longer any role for leader steadfastness.6
6The case where the organization sets the incentives is not identical to our model in which the
leader chooses his own commitment cost. The on-line appendix shows that the alternative model
delivers similar results.
17We shall argue, however, that resoluteness is still valuable. The reason is that a
leader does not commit as much as is socially optimal because some of the bene￿t
of commitment comes from internalizing coordination externalities. As long as the
leader does not appropriate this entire bene￿t, there will be too little commitment by
a rational leader to staying the course.
In contrast, a resolute leader will also make commitments to staying the course,
but such a leader will commit even more than a rational leader to sticking to a mis-
sion and thereby helps close the wedge between his marginal value of commitment
and the socially optimal value. There are three di⁄erences between resoluteness and
commitment:
1. Commitment is a choice the leader makes, not an immutable type,
2. Commitment has payo⁄ consequences, and
3. Commitment cost (strength of the statement) is a more ￿ exible policy instrument.
It could vary from project to project, while leader resoluteness is not malleable.
At the same time, there are similarities between resoluteness and commitment:
comparative statics for commitment cost are the same as for resoluteness along
almost every dimension.
Model extension. We add one additional choice to the model: The leader can
choose a cost that he and the organization will incur that is increasing in the distance
between his mission statement and the chosen strategy. We call this cost the strength
of a mission statement and interpret it as being a reputational cost borne by the leader
(and the organization).
The leader￿ s payo⁄now has a new last term that captures the cost of lost reputation.




(aj ￿ ￿ a)
2dj ￿ (aL ￿ ￿)
2 ￿ c(aL ￿ ￿L)
2: (5)
18The commitment cost c determines how big the quadratic loss is from having a ￿nal
strategy far away from the initial mission statement.
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L ). As before, each follower chooses his action to match his
expectation of the organization￿ s strategy: ai = E[aLj￿L;Si]. But follower expectations




f[￿ + c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Sig:
Given that all members￿actions vary with the reputation cost c, it is natural to
ask what payo⁄ the organization could achieve if the reputation cost parameter c was
chosen optimally. Alternatively, the optimal choice of c could also be interpreted as an
optimal incentive scheme.
Thus consider the leader￿ s choice of cost parameter c to maximize his own ex-ante
expected payo⁄:
max
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Note that the expectation is taken given the leader￿ s distorted beliefs about the
precision of the initial signal, ￿￿2
p . A stronger mission statement (higher c) shows up
in the leader￿ s expected utility in a way similar to a lower ￿2
p. Both increase the weight
the leader puts on the ￿rst signal, relative to the second.












The intuition here is that if followers have perfect information ￿2
￿ = 0 (￿ = 0), there
is no role for a commitment of the leader to stay the course, as followers are able to
coordinate their actions independently of the leader. The ￿1 term in (6) arises because
the leader expects to make some changes in the organization￿ s strategy away from the
initial mission statement and therefore wants to keep the cost of these changes small
by choosing a low c. Note also that it is possible for the optimal reputation cost to
be negative c￿
L < 0. One might interpret this as commitment to reform. In the results
that follow, we consider choices of c > 0.






L)2. Since the numerator and denominator
terms are both squares and the fraction is multiplied by ￿2, it must be negative. Since
more resoluteness is de￿ned as a lower ￿p, and @c￿
L=@￿2
p < 0, the commitment cost is
increasing in resoluteness.
Resolute leaders choose higher commitment costs because they believe that the
probability of taking an action far away from their mission statement is low. They
systematically underestimate the cost they will pay.
Optimal resoluteness. The organization￿ s payo⁄ is the same as before, with the
added reputation cost term ￿c(aL￿￿L)2. A resolute leader now a⁄ects the organization
in two ways: through the weight ￿ put on the prior belief and through the chosen
commitment cost c. The following equation sets the partial derivative @E￿
@￿2
p to zero, and




























Proposition 2 Even with a commitment device which allows the leader to vary the
strength of his mission statement, it is still optimal to choose a resolute leader. How-
ever, the level of resoluteness is lower than when c = 0.
The proof can be found in the Appendix.
There are two reasons that the organization prefers a resolute leader to a rational,
comitted leader. The ￿rst reason comes from the di⁄erence between the organization￿ s
and the leader￿ s payo⁄s. Since the alignment cost (ai￿aL)2 is always zero for the leader
and is positive for the organization, rational leaders will choose a lower commitment
cost than the organization would. Resolute leaders choose higher commitment costs
and thus reconcile this di⁄erence in objectives. Of course, another solution to this
problem would be to have the organization, rather than the leader, choose c.
The second bene￿t is that a resolute leader is more committed. Although he pledges
to pay a higher cost for deviating from his initial annoucnment, he deviates less and thus
incurs less of this cost. Both commitment and resoluteness entail costs: Commitment
a⁄ects payo⁄s directly, while resoluteness worsens adaptation. Because both costs are
convex, the lowest-cost solution is one that incurs some of each. The ideal leader
exhibits some resoluteness and incurs some commitment cost.
3.3 Can optimal contracts replace resoluteness?
The reader may wonder if the need for a resolute leader is due to the fact that both the
leader￿ s and the followers￿incentive schemes are imperfect. This intuition is correct.
For the leader, if the organization can impose a reputation cost that is contingent on
the realized signal SL, then the organization can maximize their payo⁄with a rational
21leader. The organization can impose no reputation cost on the leader for taking the
￿rst-best action and impose a very large negative reputation cost for taking any other
action. In this manner, they can e⁄ectively take the choice of action away from the
leader and make his preferences irrelevant. However, whenever the signal SL is private
information to the leader, or is not veri￿able, a signal-contingent scheme is not possible
and an incentive-compatible contract may be more costly than resoluteness, just like the
commitment cost. Similarly, a leader with just the right preference for organizational
inertia may take the optimal action, but such a leader may not exist.
For the followers, an optimal contract that rewarded coordination could, in theory,
resolve the coordination problem that is the rationale for a resolute leader. In practice,
getting followers to internalize the bene￿ts of coordination is challenging because con-
tracts cannot control followers￿options outside the ￿rm. Suppose that if followers take
an action that is less coordinated, but closer to the true state, they can get a better
job o⁄er from another ￿rm. For example, this action could be investing in skills related
to a technology that ultimately gets adopted. Then, despite a ￿rm contract that re-
wards being a team player, the followers might not coordinate as much as they should.
Therefore, since a ￿rm cannot prevent a worker from leaving, an optimal contract may
not be able to fully resolve the coordination problem.
This highlights that while resoluteness alleviates the time-consistency problem, it
does not perfectly resolve it. Yet, realistic information frictions or outside options
may render infeasible the kinds of ￿rst-best contracts that obviate the bene￿ts of
resoluteness.
4 Lead by being led
In this section, not only do followers learn from their leader (top-down information
￿ ow), leaders also learn from followers (bottom-up information ￿ ow). We replace the
exogenous signal SL with an endogenous signal, which is the average action of the
22followers, plus some noise. Our main conclusion is that this moderates the bene￿t
of resoluteness. A leader who is very stubborn dissuades his followers from acting
based on their private information and suppresses information revelation. Because the
leader￿ s action depends on what he learns from agents￿actions, which in turn depend
on what agents expect the leader to do, multiple equilibria arise.
4.1 Merits and drawbacks of resoluteness
The payo⁄ functions are as before (but with the commitment costs removed). There-
fore, the leader￿ s and followers￿￿rst order conditions are the same as in (2). Followers
also form expectations over the state as before. However, now followers￿actions aggre-






where e is the independent noise term: e ￿ N(0;￿2
e). As before, the leader uses the
signal A to update his prior belief ￿L and make a ￿nal inference about ￿. Suppose that
followers￿equilibrium strategies take the form
ai(Si) = ￿Si + (1 ￿ ￿)￿L, (7)
then we can rewrite the aggregate output signal as
^ SL := 1
￿ [A ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿L] = ￿ + 1
￿e.
Note that this signal￿ s precision is given by ￿
2￿￿2
e . Thus, the more followers rely on
their private information (the higher is ￿), the more accurate this signal becomes. Of
course, if followers rely more on their private signals Si there is also less coordination
among them. Thus, in this setting coordinated actions have both a positive payo⁄
23externality and a negative information externality because they suppress information
revelation to the leader.
Optimal actions As in Section 3.1, the leader￿ s optimal action is










where ￿ is chosen by the followers and will depend on the leader￿ s resoluteness ￿￿2
p .
As before, each follower￿ s optimal action is their forecast of the leader￿ s action:
ai(Si) = E[aLj￿L;Si] = ￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)Si): (10)
Note that this is linear in ￿L and Si, which validates the conjecture in (7). Matching
coe¢ cients reveals that the weight followers place on their private signal is:
￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿). (11)
Thus, the only di⁄erence in this new setting is that now ￿ depends on ￿ and
conversely ￿ depends on ￿. Therefore, to solve for the equilibrium actions we need to
solve the ￿xed point problem given by the equations (9) and (11).
Substituting for ￿ in equation (11) delivers a third-order polynomial in ￿
￿






This equation has three potential solutions: (i) a ￿dictatorial equilibrium￿character-





(1 ￿ ￿) ￿
q





Since we focus on stable equilibria we neglect the unstable equilibrium with the
smaller quadratic root for ￿. Note that while the dictatorial equilibrium exists for any







Proposition 3 When leaders learn from followers￿actions, there are two stable (lin-
ear) equilibria:
(i) A dictatorial equilibrium where there is perfect coordination ai = aL = ￿L, but
information ￿ow from followers to leaders is totally suppressed.
(ii) A ￿lead-by-being-led equilibrium￿ where coordination is reduced, but the or-
ganization is better adapted to the environment, as it relies on more information to
determine its strategy:
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p (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
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The logic of the multiple equilibria is the following: If followers expect leaders to
learn no new information from their actions, then they expect the leader￿ s action to
be the same as his initial announcement (aL = ￿L). Since agents want to take actions
close to the leader￿ s action, they choose the same action ai = ￿L. But when agents all
take the same actions, they reveal no new information. So, their expectation is self-
25con￿rming. In contrast, when followers expect the leader to learn new information,
they try to forecast what he will learn, using their private signals. Because their
actions are based on this forecast and on their private signals, aggregate output reveals
information. So, the expectation that the leader will learn is also con￿rmed.
Corporate culture One way of interpreting the multiplicity of equilibria in this
setting is that the role of leadership in an organization must be adapted to the orga-
nization￿ s culture. In a dictatorial organization, where followers are expected to just
coordinate around the leader￿ s mission statement it is best to have a rational, well-
informed, and competent leader. In contrast, and somewhat counter-intuitively, in a
democratic organization, where followers are expected to take a lot of initiatives and
where the leader learns from the followers￿actions, it may nevertheless be best to have
a somewhat resolute leader. This is especially valuable if the more competent leader
has signi￿cantly more precise priors about the environment than the information of
other members of the organization.
Optimal resoluteness In the dictatorial equilibrium (where ￿ = 0, ￿ = 1), leader
resoluteness has no e⁄ect on the organization￿ s ex-ante expected payo⁄because it only
works through the coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿ which, in this case, do not depend on the leader￿ s
resoluteness.
In the stable lead-by-being-led equilibrium, the organization￿ s expected payo⁄ is




e + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿
2.










26Leader resoluteness is optimal if the partial derivative @E￿
@￿2
p is negative at ￿2
p = 1.
Proposition 4 In the lead-by-being-led equilibrium, leader resoluteness increases the




e < ￿(2 ￿ ￿). (15)
Otherwise, the opposite of resoluteness, ￿indecisiveness￿ increases the expected payo⁄.
When is the leader￿ s resoluteness bene￿cial? There are situations where the leader
is already extracting most of the relevant information about the environment ￿. If the
signal the leader sees from the followers￿output is already very precise (low ￿
￿2￿2
e),
then the bene￿t of better coordination (￿(2￿￿)) matters more than the marginal loss
of signal quality. When the leader learns little from followers￿actions (￿2
e=￿
2 is large),
resoluteness worsens this problem. Indecisiveness then allows the leader to observe
more precise information and take a better-directed ￿nal action.
Setting (14) equal to zero gives the optimal degree of resoluteness, as long as the
learning equilibrium exists (13) and the second-order condition holds. The existence
condition is likely to be satis￿ed if the noise in output, the degree of leader resoluteness,
and the true precision of the leader￿ s prior are low, and the precision of agents￿private
information is high. In sum, resoluteness is most valuable when there is little noise in
output and the true variance of the leader￿ s prior is high. In these situations, the risk
that the leader￿ s resoluteness will suppress followers￿information and possibly lead
to a maladapted ￿nal action for the organization, are minimized. Note ￿nally that
the e⁄ect of changes in information quality of followers￿signals on the value of leader
resoluteness for the organization is ambiguous.
274.2 Can resoluteness be preferable to competence?
Our solution has another surprising implication. So far we have ￿xed ￿2
1, the true
variance of ￿L, to be equal to one. But, allowing for di⁄erent values of ￿2
1 is a simple way
of introducing di⁄erences in a leader￿ s competence into our model. A highly competent
leader then would be one who has a highly accurate prior ￿L, that is someone with a
low value of ￿2
1.
Intuitively, one expects greater competence of a leader to be an unreserved bene￿t
for an organization. A leader with a more accurate prior, would make better decisions
other things equal, and this can only bene￿t the organization. As it turns out, however,
greater competence of a leader in our model may also have a side e⁄ect: it may crowd
out learning from the actions of followers. If the leader￿ s prior is too precise he may no
longer be able to learn anything from the actions of the followers, as the latter decide
to ignore their own information when choosing their actions. The question then arises
in our model whether it may be preferable for the organization to have a resolute leader
who knows less, but who is also able to learn from followers.
We provide a set of conditions below on the parameters of the model such that the
organization is better o⁄with a resolute leader rather than a (possibly more competent)
rational leader. Such a situation may arise when it is better for the organization if the
leader learns from the actions of followers, and when only the resolute leader is able to
do so in equilibrium.
Observe ￿rst that when ￿2
1 varies, the resolute leader￿ s optimal action is una⁄ected
as the leader believes the variance to be ￿2
p. Thus, aL is determined by (8) and (9).
The followers￿actions are a⁄ected because when the true precision of the leader￿ s an-
nouncement ￿
￿2
0 changes, the weight followers put on that announcement when forming






￿ ). Given this new de￿nition of
￿, the followers announcements take the same form as before (10). Since both leaders￿
and followers￿actions take the same form as before, the solution is (12) and the lead-
28by-being-lead equilibrium exists whenever (13) holds. In sum, changing competence
only a⁄ects the solution through its e⁄ect on the value of ￿.
Proposition 5 Suppose there are two managers, one resolute and one rational. Both
have initial beliefs with the same perceived precision ￿￿2
p = ￿
￿2
0 , but the resolute




































then the rational, more competent leader always ends up in the dictatorial equilibrium,
while with the resolute, but less competent leader can end up in a lead-by-being-led
equilibrium. The dictatorial equilibrium is worse for the organization if
￿
2













Thus, when (16), (17) and (18) hold, the resolute leader is preferred to the more com-
petent but rational leader.
Proof. Under condition (17) only a dictatorial equilibrium exists with a rational
leader with ￿ = 1 and ￿ = 0. And under condition (16) a lead-by-being-led equilibrium
may exist with a resolute leader with precision ￿￿2
p . With the resolute leader, the three
components of the organization￿ s objective function are ￿rst,
E[￿(ai ￿ aL)
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Adding these three terms and rearranging yields,













In the dictatorial equilibrium, ￿ = 1, and E￿ = ￿￿2
0. Thus, the dictatorial equilibrium
is worse for the organization if condition (18) holds.
In light of the proposition it is possible for the organization to prefer a less com-
petent but resolute leader to a more competent but rational leader as long as the
di⁄erence in competence is not too large and the leader￿ s steadfastness is large enough.
The basic logic behind the proposition is that a more precise prior (a higher ￿
￿2
1 ) in-
duces both the rational leader and the followers to weight the mission statement more
when forming their forecasts. When followers weight the mission statement more, they
weight their idiosyncratic information less. This makes their aggregate output less in-
formative about the environment, which encourages the leader to put even less weight
on the information in output. This feedback, in turn, can result in a breakdown of the
lead-by-being-led equilibrium. As a result a less competent but more resolute leader
can welfare-dominate a more competent, rational leader who gets stuck in a dictatorial
equilibrium.7
5 Conclusion
We have proposed a model of leadership in organizations that captures a fundamental
tension between adaptation to changing circumstances and coordination of followers on
a given course of action. Speci￿cally, the leader￿ s problem is to steer the organization
7It is worth mentioning that for a less competent leaders it might be optimal to act resolute in
order to appear as competent, as in Prendergast and Stole (1996).
30towards the best overall strategy or mission, while communicating a clear mission to
other organization members that helps them coordinate and implement the organiza-
tion￿ s strategy. We have stripped down our model of leadership to ￿ve main phases.
In a ￿rst phase, the leader assesses the environment and de￿nes a mission for the or-
ganization. In a second phase, the other members attempt to coordinate around the
leader￿ s stated mission. Followers face their own dilemma, as they are aware that the
leader may change the organization￿ s strategy in a subsequent stage in light of new
information he gets about the environment. Therefore, they will use their own private
information to forecast the likely change in strategy. Since private information is het-
erogeneous, forecasts and resulting actions are heterogeneous. This is the coordination
problem that the leader is trying to minimize. In a third phase, the leader gets new
information, updates his assessment of the state and chooses a direction for the orga-
nization. Fourth and last, the state is revealed and leader￿ s and followers￿payo⁄s are
realized.
The main message of the paper is that the tension between coordination and adap-
tation creates a time-consistency problem. This problem is ameliorated when leaders
are resolute. Steadfastness causes the leader to stick to his guns because he fails to up-
date as much as he rationally should. Even when the leader can pledge a commitment
cost, being resolute is helpful for two reasons: First, it induces the leader to make a
stronger commitment not to change the organization￿ s direction. The stronger commit-
ment achieves better coordination. Second, resoluteness results in lower commitment
costs paid because the resolute leader makes smaller changes in direction. The model
also illustrates the dangers of resoluteness in situations where followers have valuable
information. Resolute leaders are less likely to learn what their followers know and
may therefore lead their organization in the wrong direction.
31A Technical Appendix
A.1 Results: Basic Model
The organization￿ s ex-ante expected payo⁄ has three components:
1. the variance of each follower￿ s action around the leader￿ s,
E[￿(ai ￿ aL)2] = E[￿(￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)Si] ￿ ￿￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)SL)2]
= E[￿((1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)Si] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)SL)2]
Since ￿L;Si;SL each have independent signal noise, and the coe¢ cients in the previous ex-
pression add up to zero, we can subtract the true ￿ from each one and then have independent,
mean-zero variables that we can take expectations of separately. The ￿rst term ￿￿L+(1￿￿)Si￿￿
is the posterior belief error of the follower. It has precision that is the sum of the signal pre-
cisions (1 + ￿
￿2
￿ ) and therefore has variance 1=1 + ￿
￿2
￿ = ￿. In the second term, SL ￿ y has
variance ￿2
L. Therefore, expected utility is
E[￿(ai ￿ aL)2] = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
L
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(￿ + ￿2
L)
But in the leader￿ s utility, he sets this term =0 because i=L.
2. the dispersion of followers￿actions around the mean,
Z
j
￿(aj ￿ ￿ a)2dj = ￿E[(￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)Si] ￿ ￿￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)￿])2]
= ￿E[(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Si + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿)2]
= ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿
Since the ￿rst signal cancels out here, this expectation is the same for the leader and the
organization.
323. the distance of the leader￿ s action from the true state,
E[￿(aL ￿ ￿)2] = ￿E[(￿￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)SL ￿ ￿)2]
= ￿￿
2E[(￿L ￿ ￿)2] + (1 ￿ ￿)2E[(SL ￿ ￿)2]
= ￿￿
2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
L:
The leader believes that this is
EP[￿(aL ￿ ￿)2] = ￿￿
2￿2
p ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
L
Organization￿ s expected utility Summing the three terms and rearranging yields,
E￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿ ￿ ￿
2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
L:
E￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(￿ + 2￿2
L + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿) ￿ ￿
2:
while the expression in the paper was : = ￿
￿
(1 ￿ ￿)2 ￿
2￿2






The partial derivative of the organization ex-ante expected payo⁄ with respect to ￿ is:
@E￿
@￿
= 2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 2￿2
L + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿) ￿ 2￿.
This is positive if
2(1 ￿ ￿)(￿ + 2￿2
L + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿) > 2￿
￿ + 2￿2





With a rational leader we have ￿2
p = 1, and therefore ￿
1￿￿ = ￿2
L. Thus, @E￿
@￿ > 0 at ￿
1￿￿ = ￿2
L,
so that some degree of resoluteness is always optimal. On the other hand, for an extremely resolute
leader who fails to update at all, ￿ ￿! 1, and the left side of the inequality approaches in￿nity, so that
@E￿
@￿ < 0. As ￿
1￿￿ is continuous for ￿ 2 (0;1), @
2E￿
@￿2 < 0 and since the weight ￿ is strictly increasing
in the perceived precision ￿￿2
p , there exists an interior optimal level of resoluteness that maximizes
33the organization￿ s expected payo⁄, which is given by
￿ + 2￿2








p = 2 + ￿￿
￿2





p = 2 + ￿￿
￿2




p = 2 + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)￿
￿2
L (22)
This proves proposition 1.
A.2 Results: Resoluteness and Commitment




(aj ￿ ￿ a)2dj ￿ (aL ￿ ￿)2 ￿ c(aL ￿ ￿L)2: (23)
The commitment cost c determines how big the quadratic loss is from having a ￿nal action far away
from the initial announcement. Given this utility, the ￿rst order condition for the leader￿ s action
yields
￿2(aL ￿ E[￿]) ￿ 2c(aL ￿ ￿L) = 0
(1 + c)aL ￿ E[￿] ￿ c￿L = 0




((￿ + c)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)SL),




L ). As before, each follower chooses his action to match its expectation of












f[￿ + c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Sig
34The organization￿ s ex-ante expected payo⁄ now has 4 components
1. the variance of each follower￿ s action around the leader￿ s,
E[￿(ai ￿ aL)2] = E[￿(
1
1 + c
((￿ + c)￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)SL) ￿
1
1 + c






E[((1 ￿ ￿)SL ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿L ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Si))2]
Since ￿L;Si;SL each have independent signal noise, and the coe¢ cients in the previous expres-
sion add up to zero, we can subtract the true ￿ from each one and then have independent, mean-
zero variables that we can take expectations of separately. The second term ￿￿L+(1￿￿)Si￿￿
is the posterior belief error of the follower. As before, it has precision that is the sum of the
signal precisions and therefore has variance 1=1 + ￿
￿2
￿ = ￿. In the second term, SL ￿ y has
variance ￿2
L. Therefore, expected utility is





(1 ￿ ￿)2(￿ + ￿2
L)
For the leader, this component of utility is zero.
2. the dispersion of followers￿actions around the mean,
Z
j





E[[￿ + c + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]￿L + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)Si












(1 ￿ ￿)2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿
The leader and the organization have the same perceived utility from this component because
the ￿rst signal drops out.
353. the distance of the leader￿ s action from the true state,
E[￿(aL ￿ ￿)2] = ￿E[(
1
1 + c
























The leader believes that this component is













4. Finally, expected utility depends on the commitment cost incurred.



















The leader believes that this will be








Organization￿ s expected utility Summing the three terms and rearranging yields the expected




































c + ￿ + (2 + c)￿2








Leader￿ s expected utility But for the leader who has distorted beliefs, (￿L ￿ ￿)2 = ￿2
p. Because
the leader understands that the followers do not believe the same that he believes, this does not
change ￿: It changes only the third and fourth terms. Furthermore, the leader gets no adverse utility
36consequences from his utility being far away from itself, so the ￿rst term is zero. That makes the







p + (1 + c)￿2















p + (1 + c)￿2
L + (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2













(1 + c)2 ￿2
p = 0
(1 ￿ ￿)2(2c￿2
p + 2(1 + c)￿2
L + 2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿ ￿ (1 + c)(￿2
p + ￿2
L)) + (￿ + c)
2 2￿2
p ￿ 2(￿ + c)(1 + c)￿2
p = 0
(1 ￿ ￿)2((c ￿ 1)￿2
p + (1 + c)￿2
L + 2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2





p) + (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿2
p + ￿2
L + 2(1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿) ￿ 2￿￿2
p = 0
Note that (1 ￿ ￿)2￿2
￿ = ￿
￿2
￿ =(1 + ￿
￿2
￿ )2 = ￿(1 ￿ ￿).
c((1 ￿ ￿)￿2
L ￿ (1 + ￿)2￿2
p) = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿￿2
L ￿ 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)) + (1 + ￿)￿2
p





In other words, in order for the ￿rst-order condition to characterize and optimum, it needs to be that
(1 ￿ ￿)￿2
L < (2 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿))￿2
p
(1 ￿ ￿)￿2
L < (1 + ￿)￿2
p
If the second-order condition holds, the utility-maximizing commitment is
c =
2(1 ￿ ￿)￿(1 ￿ ￿)
(1 + ￿)￿2




















Since ￿ < 1, this expression is always negative. Since more resoluteness means lower ￿2
p, more
resoluteness increases the optimal c for the leader to choose.
Optimal resoluteness for the organization The next step is to determine the organization￿ s



























































































































































































































38Finally, evaluate this at ￿2























+ 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
This is negative (meaning that some degree of resoluteness is optimal) if
￿￿2












+ 2￿(1 ￿ ￿) < 0
￿￿2
L ￿ ￿


























Result 1 It is ￿-maximizing for a manager with a commitment technology to be resolute.
Proof. If @E￿
@￿2
p < 0 when evaluated at ￿p = 1, then it is welfare-increasing for the manager to














Since this expression is always negative, resoluteness (￿p < 1) is always welfare-maximizing.
Result 2 The optimal level of resoluteness with commitment is lower than without it.
Proof: We prove this by substituting in the optimal level of resoluteness with no commitment
￿￿
p from (4) into the ￿rst-order condition in the environment with commitment. We show that the
resulting ￿rst-order condition is negative. Since the second derivative is negative, a value of the ￿rst
order condition lower than zero implies that the level of no-commitment resoluteness is higher than
what is optimal in the commitment setting.
Substitute the optimal resoluteness ￿￿2
p = 2+￿(2￿￿)￿
￿2




L ) in section 1 into the ￿rst-order condition above from section 2 delivers FOC(￿nocomm
p ). This
39is an expression in two variables ￿2
L and ￿. Simply plotting the function reveals that the inequality
holds for all ￿ 2 [0;1] and for all ￿2
L 2 [0;1000].
A.3 Results: Learning from Followers
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1 ￿ ￿ ￿
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p (1 ￿ ￿)￿2
￿
The organization￿ s expected payo⁄ is the same as in section 1, except that ￿2
L is replaced with ￿
￿2￿2
e.
E￿ = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)2(2￿
￿2￿2
e + ￿(2 ￿ ￿)) ￿ ￿
2
Next, substitute ￿
￿2 = (1 ￿ ￿)￿2(1 ￿ ￿)￿2 to get an expression with only ￿ and parameters.
E￿ = ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)￿2￿2
e ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)2￿(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿
2
Then, take a partial derivative of this payo⁄ with respect to resoluteness in order to derive the





























p < 0: The partial derivative is negative at ￿2
p = 1, meaning that some resoluteness is optimal
if
(1 ￿ ￿)￿(2 ￿ ￿) > ￿
￿(2 ￿ ￿) >
￿
1 ￿ ￿







This proves proposition 4.
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